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I. Introduction
T he world's population is ageing. 1 In Canada, for example, the number of citizens who are aged 65 or over is expected to double between 2011 and 2036, and around 25 per cent of the population is expected to be in that category by 2051. 2 In the United Kingdom, similarly, 23 per cent of the population is projected to be aged 65 or older by 2035, while only 18 per cent will be under 16 by then. 3 One of the most important questions in social policy is therefore how to allocate the burdens of funding and providing care for the increasing number of people who will require it in the decades to come. In England, there is currently much discussion about the Government's attempts to implement an approximation of the Dilnot Commission's recommendations on the Funding of Care and Support, which concern the provision of formal social care for those who require it.
4 Th e funding question forms part of an overhaul of the whole system of adult social care, 5 and the legislation eventually known as the Care Act 2014 6 will bring about what has been described as "the biggest change in the law governing the operation of care and support in England since the National Assistance Act 1948."
7 Th e focus of this paper, however, is on the informal carer, who provides care services in the absence of any contractual or other legal duty to do so. In particular, it concerns the use of private law remedies, i.e. the outcomes of a claim by the carer against the care recipient, or more likely her estate, in order to support, compensate or reward the carer. It does not discuss particular private law remedies in detail. Much of that work was undertaken in my recent monograph, Informal Carers and Private Law, 8 in which I evaluated property law, family property law, succession law, and unjust enrichment as potential sources of remedies for a carer from a comparative common law perspective. Rather, the purpose of this article is to consider the normative question of whether private law remedies for the carer can be justifi ed in general, with a particular concentration on the English policy context but an awareness that private law approaches to care have been taken in several other jurisdictions including Canada.
Th is article begins by sketching the social policy context in which the informal carer operates in England.
9 It then examines the scope for if no dependant is living in it. 14 Local authorities are placed under a duty to recover payments covering residential care that they have provided in certain circumstances, 15 and they also have a power to charge for non-residential services including personal care. 16 A charge on the care recipient's home is one method by which a local authority can recover its costs.
17
Th e Dilnot Commission recommended that the maximum lifetime contribution towards care expected of any one individual should be capped at £35,000, and that "the asset threshold for those in residential care beyond which no means-tested help is given should increase."
18
Th e Government has agreed with the principles espoused by the Dilnot Commission, though clearly not the proposed fi gures. It has been announced that a cap of £72,000 for those of state pension age and over will be implemented in England in 2016.
19 Th e Government has also made a commitment that, by virtue of a universal deferred payment scheme, no-one will have to sell her home during her lifetime in order to pay for care. 20 While the currently anticipated cap is lower than the £75,000 cap originally proposed by the Government (with the diff erence being funded partly by a freeze in inheritance tax thresholds), 21 either cap would still be more than double that proposed by the Dilnot Commission. Th e cap's narrow focus on care itself also means that it is not thought to include the cost of food or renting a room in a care 14 home, 22 and many of the details will be left to statutory instruments rather than being contained in the Care Act itself. 23 Moreover, despite the Government's intention to introduce a national minimum eligibility threshold for care and support in England, the actual level of provision of social care will remain considerably subject to the discretion of local authorities, 24 and again the details will be contained in secondary legislation. 25 Many such local authorities are struggling to provide adequate services in the current economic climate. 26 What is more, a close reading of private law cases suggests that the extent to which some care recipients will resist state involvement in their aff airs should not be under-estimated, 27 and many such recipients will want to stay in their own homes at all costs, notwithstanding the extent of their care needs.
It seems, therefore, that English society will continue to rely on the vital work of the informal carer, even in the context of a reformed social care system. Th e Government has accepted this, and given informal carers the perhaps dubious compliment that the latter "embody the spirit of the Big Society," 28 which has been described as "[a] society in which power and responsibility have shifted: one in which … individuals and communities have more aspiration, power and capacity to take decisions and solve problems themselves, and where all of us take greater responsibility for ourselves, our communities and one another." 29 Th e Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, for its part, has said that informal care provided in the home is the most important source of care from a global perspective. 30 Before proceeding further, it is necessary to consider in more detail what is meant by the phrase "informal carers." Defi nitions are of course fraught with diffi culties. 31 One attempt is to say that "[a] carer spends a signifi cant proportion of their life providing unpaid support to family or potentially friends. Th is could be caring for a relative, partner or friend who is ill, frail, disabled or has mental health or substance misuse problems." 32 Crucially, defi nitions of "informal carer" are at least intended to exclude carers for able-bodied children, 33 and it is worth noting that there have been interesting discussions about the status of carers for disabled children and carers who are themselves children. 34 Th e 2011 census data indicate that there are 5.8 million informal carers in England and Wales, 35 as compared to the 5.2 million recorded by the 2001 census. 36 Meanwhile, the representative organisation, Carers UK, estimates that 60 per cent of people will become a carer at some point in their lives. 37 Th e opportunity costs of caring can be very high: it has been claimed that UK carers lose an average of £11,000 per year due to their caring responsibilities, 38 and signifi cant health problems often arise as a result of those same responsibilities. 39 Conversely, informal care has been described as the "invisible pillar" of the welfare state, 40 and the total amount of informal care provided in the UK has been valued at £87 billion per year. 41 English law does make some attempt to provide state support for carers themselves, as distinct from helping the care recipients for whom they care. 42 For example, the Carers (Recognition and Services) Act 1995 43 granted carers the right to an assessment of their ability to provide care when a local authority is ascertaining a care recipient's need for more formal community care. Th e Carers and Disabled Children Act 2000 44 made the right to an assessment independent of the care recipient's assessment, and gave local authorities powers to provide services for carers, before the
Carers (Equal Opportunities) Act 2004
45 placed local authorities under a duty to inform carers of their rights under the previous two Acts, and required consideration of the carer's employment, training, and housing needs as part of the assessment. Analogously with the provision of social care itself, however, Jonathan Herring has criticised the fact that such statutory provisions are "largely permissive, authorizing local authorities to provide … services … rather than dictating that they must." 46 As well as rights relating to fl exible working and non-discrimination extended to carers in the employment context, 47 there is limited direct fi nancial support available for carers in England.
48 A carer's allowance is a limited benefi t payable to a person who spends at least 35 hours per week caring for someone who is herself in receipt of certain benefi ts related to illness or disability, 49 though it has been criticised for its inadequacy.
50
Th ere is also the possibility that a care recipient could use the Direct Payments scheme to acquire the means to pay an informal carer in lieu of social care provided by the local authority, eff ectively transforming the care into a "care worker." 51 A signifi cant current limitation, however, is that a Direct Payment recipient is often prohibited from purchasing services from spouses, civil partners, or people living with the recipient as such, or from close relatives living in the same household.
52
Th e Department of Health has said that the Care Act is intended, inter alia, to place carers on an equal footing with care recipients in regards to its fundamental principle that the purpose of the social care system is the well-being of the individual, 53 make clear that the principle "is not intended to be directly enforceable as an individual right." 54 Specifi c reforms aimed at carers include the removal of the previous requirement that a carer either does or intends to provide regular and substantial care before his needs can be assessed by the local authority. 55 As Herring points out, however, while "[t]here is much to be welcomed" in the proposals embodied in the Act, "at the end of the day it will be the levels of funding which are key, rather than legislative structure."
56 Given this and the general fears expressed about funding and care earlier in this section, the next section of the article considers an alternative "private law" approach to supporting informal care.
III. Justifying a Private Law Approach to Informal Care
Th e previous section of the article has demonstrated that there is currently some state support for informal carers in England, and they should benefi t both directly and indirectly from a reformed social care system to an extent. But the important question for present purposes is whether we can nevertheless justify a private law approach to supporting, compensating, or rewarding the carer, perhaps as an attempt to redress the fi nancial or health diffi culties that the carer has suff ered due to the responsibilities he has undertaken. For example, it could be asked whether the carer should be able to claim a share of the care recipient's estate. 60 the cases in which this occurred were worthy of rationalisation and analysis irrespective of the state support question.
Given that the system of state support in England is likely to remain stretched for the foreseeable future, it may nevertheless become necessary to use private law remedies in order to adequately support and encourage informal care for elderly and disabled people where appropriate resources exist on the part of care recipients. Th is is particularly true in light of fears that the availability of informal care will be reduced in the years to come. 61 Mika Oldham therefore pragmatically advocates a system of "successional priority" for informal carers, which would give them a prioritised right of provision from the care recipient's estate. 62 It is telling that when reviewing my monograph, Herring rather humbly contrasts my own "modest" private law-oriented proposals that he considers "realisable and carefully tailored to fi t within current legal approaches," 63 with the "tendency for those writing in this area to insist we need nothing less than a complete change in the way we see the world and organise law." 64 An unjust enrichment lawyer might say that the carer is a "risk-taker" who has freely chosen to confer a benefi t on the care recipient and should not, for that reason alone, expect payment after the event. 65 Indeed, the law of unjust enrichment has not yet proved fertile ground for claims by carers (and other people in "domestic" relationships in England and Wales). 66 But the Canadian courts, tending to focus on the absence of "juristic reasons" for an enrichment 67 distinct from the English "unjust factor" approach, 68 have been prepared to uphold claims by carers using that area of the law. 69 Moreover, even if the care provided is by defi nition informal and not the subject of contractual remuneration in a technical sense, Fineman has argued that the choice to care "occurs within the constraints of social conditions, including history and tradition." 70 Writing from a US perspective, she fails to see why most of the costs of care should be borne by carers themselves rather than being distributed amongst the true benefi ciaries of care, whether institutional or individual. If it is necessary to provide a private means of support for carers who are genuinely in need of encouragement, it also seems unjust to deny such private law remedies to those who do not require such an inducement, but do suff er disadvantages. Even in the context of entirely altruistic friendship-based relationships, John Eekelaar is content that a succession-based claim on the death of one of the parties would "fi t in with the values of friendship." 71 justifi cation for a private law approach depends on the failure of the state to provide adequate support for care and carers. It could be argued that in a perfect society, the state would provide adequate support such that any justifi cation for private law remedies that previously existed immediately falls away. It could also be said that, given the anxiety about the amount that individuals should have to pay towards the cost of formal care, it would be very diffi cult to justify imposing additional liability in respect of informal care on care recipients.
But it is not clear that things are really as simple as that. Many scholars are quite content to say that there should be some sort of redistribution of property following the end of a marriage or civil partnership, 72 in spite of the potential availability of state benefi ts for the parties to the relationship. 73 Indeed, one of Lady Hale's concerns about the greater enforceability of pre-nuptial agreements in England, expressed in her dissenting speech in Radmacher v Granatino, 74 was that an economically stronger party could use such an agreement to "cast the burden of supporting her husband onto the state" rather than undertaking the burden herself.
75 When evaluating the English Law Commission's proposals for an equivalent redistributive scheme for unmarried cohabitants, 76 Simone Wong has argued that there is "no logical reason to limit access to the law to only couple-based relationships," 77 even if she emphasised the distinctive nature of the commitment in such conjugal couple-based relationships in later work, 78 and even though a lot of informal care self-evidently takes place within couple-based relationships.
Moreover, testamentary freedom is already limited in English law through its allowing a wide range of individuals to claim discretionary provision out of a deceased person's estate under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, 79 some of whom are carers, 80 and it might legitimately be asked why a carer for that person should not be specifi cally recognised as a potential family provision claimant in his own right, particularly where a such a person has a need for future maintenance comparable to that of other possible claimants as a result of his caring. Th e specifi c inclusion of caring relationships in such legislation is not a fanciful suggestion, but already occurs in several parts of Australia, for example. 81 Analogously with the widely accepted view on divorcebased claims, under the current law of family provision on death, English courts are generally reluctant to attach a great deal of signifi cance to the availability of state support for an applicant when evaluating his claim.
82
Perhaps it is possible to go as far as to say that private property redistribution is more readily justifi able in the case of a genuine caring relationship rather than a marriage or couple-based relationship per se, since a true caring relationship confers a vital benefi t, by defi nition. In other words, a caring relationship is not necessarily a status-based relationship like marriage or civil partnership, in relation to which the English courts are to some extent content merely to assume that there is a justifi cation for a redistribution of property rights when a relationship breaks down by virtue of a "partnership" model, 83 but arguably provides more benefi ts to society per se than some of those status-based relationships. Recognition of this notion would take us closer to the focus on the "carer-dependant" paradigm that Fineman (at least at one time) considered vital for family law 84 and, in Maxine Eichner's words, change "the basis of entitlement … to desert." 85 Public opinion may jeopardise such principled thinking. Th ere is at least some evidence that a signifi cant portion of the population is uncomfortable with the idea of linking care and private rewards, 86 and care must be taken that people are not allowed to fall unknowingly into relationships generating rights and obligations without good reason. 87 Th ere is, moreover, a converse risk that the recognition of caring relationships facilitating property redistribution, inter alia, could be manipulated to undermine equality-oriented legislation aimed at conjugal same-sex couples. 88 It is nevertheless signifi cant that although Fineman herself advocates for greater state support of the carer, she also accepts that care recipients "owe an individual debt to their individual caretakers," which exists alongside a broader societal debt owed to those carers. 89 It is not my intention to argue here that private law should be the predominant means of support for carers, that a claim should be available in every situation, or that a carer should automatically be paid out of the care recipient's resources as though he had been providing formal social care for her. Indeed, in many cases a claim will be impossible simply because the care recipient has lived or died with insuffi cient assets, particularly in light of the formal care costs considered above. 90 Moreover, we should not seek to encourage the state to regard private law as the major mode of governance in relation to care, and Susan Boyd and Claire Young rightly express concern from a Canadian perspective that the recognition of a variety of relationships can cause governments to "offl oad responsibility onto those private relationships, resulting in more expectations being made of those relationships in terms of taking care of 'their own. '" 91 It is also legitimate to quibble about important details of any private law claim by a carer, as I did in my monograph, and specifi cally about questions such as: should the claim be dependent on a promise made by the care recipient to the carer?; 92 what should be the basis for relief?; 93 how should the "carer" be precisely defi ned?; should claims be actively restricted to the time after the care recipient has died?; 94 or how should the carer's claim be weighed against those of non-caring but dependent family members? 95 Th is article simply suggests that a normative justifi cation for supporting care using private law can be found, and that it does not necessarily depend fully on inadequate state support for care in the true sense.
IV. Conclusion
I hope I have provided some food for thought in this article. Of course, whatever the lofty aims of the Care Act, it seems unlikely that we will ever live in that perfect society where the state will provide fully adequate support for carers and care recipients. In the imperfect context, private law could well come increasingly to the fore, and the question posed in this article may never really have to be posed by policymakers in an undiluted form. While private law should never be used to allow the state to abdicate its responsibility to ensure that care is supported, a normative justifi cation for a private law approach to the issue can nevertheless be found. As a closing question, readers may wish to consider why society might be more comfortable about private redistribution of property in respect of some socially useful relationships than others.
